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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
EDWARD R. STEVENS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FEARN GRAY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 7781 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THlE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Defendant and Respondent, above named, respectfully 
requests the Court to grant a rehearing in the above en-
titled cause and to modify its decision filed on the 20th day 
of July, 1953, and affinn the judgment of the trial court 
for the reasons and upon the grounds as follows, to-wit: 
1. The Court erred in concluding that the evidence 
does not justify the trial court's allowance of 361;2c per day 
for feeding the cattle fed by the defendant in his feed yard 
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and concluding that the evidence justifies an allowance of 
only 25c per head per day. 
2. The Court erred in finding that the defendant was 
chargeable with the loss of 31 head of partnership cattle 
not accounted for and in finding that defendant charged 
the partnership for feeding said 31 head of cattle. 
3. The Court erred in failing to find that defendant 
was entitled to $1,000.00 for the use of his personal auto-
mobile on partnership business. 
4. The Court erred in failing to allow defendant 
$1,000.00 claimed to have been paid on plaintiff's note at 
the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner, believing that a re-examina-
tion of the record, by the Court, will result in a revised 
opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court, respect-
fully submits that a rehearing should be granted and that 
the decision should be revised affirming the judgment of 
the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As we understand the Court's decision, it is predicated 
on the conclusion that the preponderance of the evidence 
is against the allowance made by the trial court of 36%c 
per day per head for feeding partnership cattle by the de-
fendant in his feed yard and that the preponderance of the 
evidence justifies an allowance of only 25c per day. 
The Court also found that the defendant was charge-
able with the loss of 31 head of partnership cattle and found 
that defendant charged the partnership with feeding said 
31 head. 
The decision further finds that defendant is entitled 
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to only $750.00 for the use of his personal automobile in 
connection with partnership business. 
The Court further held that the defendant was not en-
titled to credit of $1,000.00 paid on plaintiff's note held by 
the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork. 
We have discussed the testimony at length in our main 
brief, and shall refer herein only to such as we deem per-
tinent to cover the points presented in this petition. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ALLOWANCE OF 36:Y:!c PER DAY FOR FEEIDING THlE 
CATTLE FED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HIS FEED 
YARD AND CONCLUDING THAT THE EVllDENCE JUS-
TIFIES AN ALLOWANCE OF ONLY 25c PER HEAD 
PER DAY. 
This Court reversed the trial court upon two principal 
points, to-wit: 
The allowance made to the defendant for feeding part-
nership cattle in defendant's feed yard and his failure to 
account for 31 head of cattle. It likewise finds that the 
court was in error in allowing defendant $1,000.00 paid on 
plaintiff's note at the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork. 
The Court also found that defendant was entitled to 
$750.00 for use of his personal automobile, in partnership 
business. The trial ·court made no findings at all upon the 
latter item. 
At the outset of its opinion this Court comments upon 
the unusually long time elapsing between the time of the 
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trial and the court's decision. May we be permitted to ob-
serve that arter the final pleading was filed, September 26, 
194 7, numerous briefs were filed. 
On January 25, 1948, defendant's chief counsel, at-
torney R. A. Porter, passed away. 
The trial court was very patient in affording coun-
sel every opportunity to file amended pleadings and ex-
tensively brief the case. 
It is stated in the Court's opinion: 
"In his effort to emphasize his argument that the trial 
court had forgotten the evidence and therefore failed 
to accurately adjudicate the matter, Stevens magnani-
mously admits that it credited him with two substan-
tial items, feeding cattle, $238.54 and $423.35 bank de-
posit, which are in excess of the amounts claimed by 
him. Corrections with respect thereto should be 
made.'' 
Plaintiff's counsel draws much praise from the Court, 
and this commendation is ill-deserved. Counsel for plain-
tiff takes advantage of the time between the trial and the 
memorandum decision to attack the trial court and insinu-
ate that the court allowed plaintiff credits in excess of the 
amounts claimed by plaintiff. This Court seemed so im-
pressed with the apparent fairness of plaintiff's counsel that 
it observes-"Stevens magnani,mously admits that it credi-
ted him with two substantial items, feeding cattle, $238.54 
and $423.35 bank deposit which are in excess of the amounts 
Claimed by him." We fear plaintiff's counsel protests too 
much. 
In defendant's answer to amended complaint and amed-
ded counterclaim, Gray claims that on March 2, 1939, he 
paid $423.35 on defendant's personal note (R. 49). In plain-
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tiff's reply it is alleged in paragraph 4 (R. 54) "and he de-
nys that he received the further sum of $423.35 or any part 
thereof." 
As to the second item, plaintiff in his reply to defend-
ant's amended counterclaim (R. 63) claims credit for two 
items deposited to the credit of the partnership, $234.85 and 
$3.67. It may be a mere coincidence, but these two items 
make up the total allowed plaintiff by the court in its mem-
orandum decision (R. 76) and its findings of fact (R. 80), 
to-,,it: S238.56. The item of $238.54 mentioned in this 
Court's decision will be found nowhere in any pleading or 
brief in connection with this case. It is significant that 
counsel observes in his brief, page 32, that the court in its 
decision credited plaintiff with two items as a deposit to 
the credit of the partnership. One for $238.56 and the other 
for $423.35. Counsel further observes that these items will 
also be found in findings of fact. It is further stated that 
no claim was made for the exact amounts above specified; 
but it is significant that counsel in his reply (R. 63) did 
claim two specific items, $234.85 and $3.67, which total 
$238.56, the amount found by the trial court. 
It is amazing that plaintiff's counsel should now at-
tack the court for crediting him with items which he now 
disclaims while conceding that items complained of were 
set forth in the court's memorandum of decision and in the 
court's findings of fact. 
Why did plaintiff's counsel not call this to the trial 
court' attention, instead of misleading the court, if his po-
sition be correct, into crediting him with two items which 
he knew at the time were in excess of amounts claimed by 
plaintiff. Counsel should not stand by and permit the court 
to make such an error, if an error was made, and then at-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
tack the court upon the ground that the court had forgot-
ten the evidence in order to draw commendation for his 
magnanimous attitude. 
By his pleadings and by his argument to the trial court, 
counsel induced the court to conclude that the defendant 
was claiming $423.35 more than he was entitled to and that 
plaintiff should be credited with $238.56, for which plain-
iff claimed credit. 
It is further significant that nowhere in the pleadings 
was there any claim that the item, $238.56 (or $238.54) rep-
resented feeding cattle; that item was a deposit which plain-
tiff claimed he had made to the partnership in two separate 
deposits. One for $234.85 and one for $3.67 (R. 63). 
Only when counsel were invited to discuss this matter 
with the writer of the court's opinion, on December 1, 1952, 
did plaintiff's counsel suggest that he had been credited 
with more than he was entitled to. For more than 5 years 
counsel had fought for the credit, by pleadings, argument, 
and brief, claiming that he was entitled to have the item of 
$423.35 deleted from defendant's claimed credits and that 
he was entitled to credit for the two items making up the 
$238.56, which the court allowed him. We surmise that 
counsel made this show of magnanimity only to prejudice 
the Court in his favor and against defendant and the trial 
court. 
In the case of Silver King Consol. Mining Co. vs. Sut-
ton et al, 85 Utah 297, 39 P. (2d) 682, this Court at page 
302 of the Utah Report said: "This being a suit in equity, 
it is our duty to examine the evidence, determine its weight, 
and reach our own conclusions with respect thereto, bearing 
in mind, however, the rule so ofter announced by this Court 
that the findings of a trial court will not be disturbed un-
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less we are of the opinion they are against the dear prepon-
derance of the evidence." 
The trial court heard all the witnesses, was better able 
to determine their credibility. 
That court was not obliged nor would it be warranted 
in finding for plaintiff because he produced more witnesses. 
Preponderance of the evidence it not to be measured by the 
number of witnesses. A dozen witnesses, none of whom did 
feeding comparable to the feeding done by the defendant, 
does not constitute preponderance of the evidence. An ex-
amination of the record discloses that the witnesses called 
by Stevens, other than Glen Cowan, and David Shu1er, fed 
no great number of cattle. 
As observed at page 9 of our initial brief, it is alleged 
in paragraph 2 of plaintiff's amended complaint that plain-
tiff and defendant agreed to engage in the business of buy-
ing, feeding, and selling cattle, particu1arly steers, to be 
fed and sold for beef. 
This Court seemed impressed with the graciousness 
and magnanimity of plaintiff to such an extent that it as-
serts with apparent sincerity the several points argued by 
plaintiff's counsel, to-wit: 
That Gray claimed only 35c per day for feeding the 
cattle in his original answer and counterclaim, and that the 
charge of 36¥2c per day claimed by Gray in his amended 
counterclaim were an afterthought to offset against Stevens' 
claim. 
We invite the Court to compare plaintiff's first com-
plaint and his amendment thereto with his amended com-
plaint. We believe that defendant's pleadings are quite as 
consistent as plaintiff's. In his first complaint, plaintiff 
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prayed judgment for more than $16,000.00 which in his 
amended complaint was toned down to about $9,000.00 
We invite the Court to examine plaintiff's claim in the 
first complaint for wintering calves (12-2-40) (R. 5} and 
the same claim in the amended complaint, wintering cattle 
1937-38. We submit that if this Court will re-examine the 
record and the testimony as it really is and without the fa-
vorable and unfounded notion that plaintiff has been mag-
nanimous, the Court will affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
The Court's opinion suggests that Gray's testimony is 
not too credible -- that he was "self-interested in the 
highest degree because he was being sued on the account 
and was seeking to offset his charges against it." 
The apparent conclusion of this Court that the defend-
ant was offering evidence for the purpose of making an 
offset against plaintiff could hardly be expected to result 
in any different conclusion. The opinion observes that de-
fendant produced only one other witness whereas plaintiff 
presented close to a dozen witnesses. 
Again we observe that the trial judge observed the wit-
nesses, saw them while testifying, and was in a better po-
sition to appraise their creditability. 
While the opinion refers to Gray's self-interest, it as-
sumes that the testimony of the plaintiff and his son, How-
ard, were not tainted with self-interest. 
It is observed that Gray himself contracted with others 
to feed partnership steers at lesser figures that he claims. 
We have only one such contract which is before the Court, 
and that is the contract with Dave Shuler (Exhibit "K") 
which was signed by both Gray and Stevens, which will be 
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referred to later, and which we believe justifies the trial 
court's decision. 
We invite the Court to reread the testimony of the wit-
nesses called by both plaintiff and defendant. Nor will the 
record, in our humble opinion, support this Court's conclu-
sion that Rodney Martin fed at a daily cost of about 24c. 
None of the witnesses called by plaintiff, other than 
David Shuler fed steers to be sold for beef. The record 
shows that Howard Stevens feed 77 head for 130 days; that 
the animals gained in that period only 110 lbs. each (Ex-
hibit "F"). (A starvation diet). 
The Court is invited to read our discussion of the tes-
timony of Howard Stevens, on pages 32-34 of our original 
brief. It must be conceded that Gray fed the steers fed by 
him cheaper than did Hloward Stevens, when the gain in 
weight of 200 lbs. per animal (Tr. 197) of the animals fed 
by Gray is taken into account. What other purpose is there 
in feeding steers to be sold for beef? 
The Court's opinion states that Stevens presented evi-
dence that one man could take care of about 200 head of 
cattle. The observation seems not too appropriate when 
the record discloses that the only witnesses fur plaintiff 
who testified to feeding approximately any such number 
of cattle, were David Shuler and Glen Cowan. 
David Jones fed 50 head (Tr. 495). Gilbert Johnson 
fed 30 to 60 (Tr. 540). Howard Stevens fed 77 head (Tr. 
552). Davis Bros. fed 60 or 64 head (Tr. 488). The rec-
ord fails to disclose the number of cattle fed by plaintiff 
(Tr. 526), William Christmas or Fay Packard. 
The only witness who testified that one man could take 
care of 200 head of cattle was Glen Cowan. He testified 
as follows: 
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"Now I think one man can feed 200 head of cattle. I 
am speaking only of my experience." He further testified, 
however, that he hired one man (Tr. ·485). 
The trial judge was not obliged to give credence to the 
testimony of Cowan on that point when we consider cer-
tain other facts connected with his testimony. Mr. Cowan 
testified that the only record he had of feeding, was 220 
head of yearlings, fed in 1946 and 1947 (Tr. 485); that he 
fed 7 1/3 lbs. of grain per day and 10 lbs. of hay; that the 
220 head were yearlings ( Tr. 480) . He also testified that 
he fed 500 tons of corn silage, about % of which had ripe 
corn on the stalks (Tr. 491). 
At page 39 of his brief, counsel, referring to the testi-
mony of Cowan, makes the following statement: 
"On cross examination he testified that he also fed 
about 500 tons of corn silage to the 220 head of cattle, or 
about 10 lbs. per head per day." 
Cowan further testified that the 220 head of yearlings 
he fed in 1946-4 7 went into his feed lot on October 2 and 
were taken out one load per week, beginning December 7. 
The last ones were taken out January 23 (Tr. 482-3), which 
means that the yearlings were in his feed yard between 66 
and 113 days, or an average time of 89 days. If the 220 
head of yearlings consumed 500 tons (1,000,000 lbs. of corn 
silage in 89 days, they consumed 1,000,000 lbs. in 19,580 
animal days, or over 51 lbs. of corn silage per animal per 
day. 
Is there any good reason why the trial judge should 
give any credit to the testimony of such a witness? 
Counsel in his opening brief, page 14, states that Mr. 
Cowan kept a record of the amount of hay, grain, and sil-
age that the animals cons1lJlW(}. He testified that the hay 
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was weighed (Tr. 483); That three stacks were near his feed 
yard and two were 6 miles away (Tr. 485). The evidence is 
\Uldisputed, that there was only one set of scales in Payson 
(Tr. 293), and that Cowan's feed yard was in Payson (Tr. 
479). Is it surprising that the court who saw the witness 
and heard his testimony would give little credence to such a 
witness? Does the Court believe he hauled the hay 6 miles 
to a scale to weigh it before feeding it to his cattle? 
Cowan didn't deny that 2 lbs. of grain per hundred lbs. 
of weight was not good feeding. When asked as to such a 
ration, he answered: "I say that is not the case in my case. 
I don't know anything else, what anybody else does." (Tr. 
488). 
Counsel further observes in his brief, page 15, that Cow-
an testified that to feed more than 1 lb. of grain per hun-
dred lbs. to animals in injurious. If Cowan fed only one lb. 
of grain to 100 lbs. of weight, the animals he was feeding 
were not only yearlings, but small yearlings; 735 lbs. ani-
mals compared with the 1300 lb. animals fed by Gray. 
One further significant statement appears in the testi-
mony of Cowan; he stated: "If I ·wasn't hauling feed for 
the cattle, I was there; we usually started in the morning 
about 7:30, take the first feeding and about 2:00 in the aft-
ernoon the second feeding.--We fed grain twice and the 
hay three times" (Tr. 486). 
The manner in which Cowan fed 220 head of yearlings 
(735 pounders) does not establish that the defendant fed 
in the same manner. We call the Court's atention to the 
fact that no two witnesses that testified for plaintiff fed in 
like manner. The most significant conclusion to be drawn 
from the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses is the divergence 
in their methods of feeding. 
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Contradicting the testimony of Cowan is the testimony 
of the Davis Bros. The Davis ranch was owned by Vaughn 
Davis and his brother, Lavar· Davis (Tr. 587). Lavar Davis 
testified that he, his brother Vaughn, and· another brother 
assisted in feeding these cattle (Tr. 588). 
It is significant that the undisputed evidence is that 
three Davis brothers assisted in taking care of 60 or 64 head 
of cattle belonging to the partnership. Not very corrobo-
rative of the testimony of Cowan that one man could take 
care of 200 head of cattle. 
All witnesses produced by plaintiff fed differently. 
William Christmas testified that everybody feeds differently 
(Tr. 563) .. Christmas testified he fed 15 lbs. of alfalfa hay 
on the average (Tr. 563). 
Glen Cowan testified that the cattle he fed ate an av-
erage· of 10 1bs. of hay per day (Tr. 483). 
Plaintiff testified that a steer will consume over a 
period of 114 days 15 to 20 lbs. of hay per day (Tr. 542). 
Gilbert A. Johnson testified that he fed about 20.lbs. 
of hay per day during the feeding period (Tr. 505). 
David Jones testified that he fed about 20 lbs. of hay 
per day (Tr. 496). 
Fay C. Packard testified that a steer would consume 
over the feeding period, between 15 and 20 lbs.- Tr. 446). 
Howard Stevens, plaintiff's son, testified that he fed 
17 or 18 lbs. of hay on an average (Tr. 553) to steers that 
went in at 950 lbs. and out on 1060 lbs. 
David Jones testified that he fed two lbs. or so of grain 
for first three weeks; that he never fed any more than six 
lbs. per day of grain Tr. 495) . 
Fay C. Packard testified that a steer at 1,000 lbs. would 
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consume an average of six or seven lbs. of grain (Tr. 445). 
3Jt of a lb. per 100 weight of animal. 
Howard Stevens testified that he fed 6.6 lbs. of grain 
to the 77 head of cattle that went in at about 950 lbs. and 
out at 1060 lbs. (or less than 2/3 of a lb. for each 100 lbs. 
of animal.) 
William Christmas testified he fed lib. of grain to 100 
lbs. of weight over full feeding period (Tr. 569). 
Plaintiff testified that he fed 7 or 8 lbs. of grain per 
day to animals (Tr. 542) that weighed about 1,000 lbs. when 
they went into the feed lot (Tr. 549) or % of a lb. to 100 
lbs. of weight. 
Vaughn Davis testified that he fed about eight lbs. of 
grain per day (Tr. 474). He also testified that he fed them 
20 lbs. of hay and 50 lbs. of beet pulp per animal per day 
(Tr. 473-4). 
Gilbert Johnson testified he fed 1 to 1% lb. of grain to 
each 100 lbs. of weight (Tr. 503) . He also testified that he 
never fed steers alone-but steers, heifers and cows (505). 
That he considers a pound to a pound and a quarter 
of grain per day per hundred pounds of weight of the ani-
mal is good feeding (Tr. 504). 
Mr. Johnson testified that he also fed 2 lbs. of dry beet 
pulp in addition to the grain (Tr. 506). 
We submit that the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses 
as to what they fed, considering the number fed and the 
different methods of feeding, does not contradict the tes-
timony of the defendant as to what he fed. The purpose 
of feeding cattle for beef is to put weight on them. Defend-
ant testified as to the rate charged by commercial feed lots 
during the period the partnership cattle were being fed. 
He testified that commercial feed lots charged 4c a day per 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
100 lbs. of weight of the animal. That such feed lots would 
charge 40c a day for feeding a 1,000 lb. steer and that the 
charge would be prorated over the time the steer was in 
feeding (Tr. 196-7). 
The defendant testified that the steers he fed weighed 
in at 1100 and out at 1300 (Tr. 197). 
Prorated over the period the charge for feeding such 
steers in a commercial feed lot would be 48c per animal per 
day (Tr. 197). No testimony was offered to refute· the 
testimony that such charges were the charges actually made 
by such commercial feed lots. 
Counsel observes at page 47 of his brief, that Shuler 
probably made a profit of 5c per head per day for feeding 
the partnership cattle. If commercial feed lots made the 
same profit (5c per head per day) their total feeding ex-
penses would represent 43c per head per day, which amount 
is more than Gray charged for all his feed, and men, teams, 
and wagons. 
No testimony was produced to show that commercial 
feed lots charge any less than the defendant testified to. 
In our original brief at pages 32-3, we computed the 
cost per lb. in increase of weight of animals fed by How-
ard Stevens compared with the increase in weight of the 
animals fed by Gray. In order to procure the same increase 
in weight, Howard Stevens would be obliged to expend 49.9c 
per animal per day. 
The Court observes in its opinion that an analysis of 
the testimony of Rodney Martin shows that his average 
daily cost was about 24c. 
Rodney Martin testified in cross examination that the 
average of the grain fed over the feeding period would be 
close to 12 to 15 lbs. per day per animal (Tr. 602); that he 
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fed 4 lbs. of dried beet pulp, molasses treated (Tr. 603); 
that hefed 5lbs. of beet syrup per animal per day (Tr. 603); 
that he fed 18lbs. of hay over the full period and 2 to 3lbs. 
of corn silage with matured corn on the stalks (Tr. 603). 
He testified that he fed 2 to 3 lbs. of grain (Tr. 606) the 
first 2 weeks and that he was feeding 10 lbs. at the end of 4 
weeks. However, he fed 20 lbs. of hay per head during the 
first 2 weeks (Tr. 609), and after the end of the first month 
he went on full feed and fed 12 to 15 lbs. of grain per week. 
We submit that the testimony of Mr. Martin justifies the 
following conclusions: A-That he fed an average of 2:Y2 
lbs. of grain per day for the first 2 weeks, 6¥2 lbs. per day 
for the next 2 weeks, and 13¥2 lbs. of grain per day for 
the remaining 13 weeks. We submit that Mr. Martin fed 
on the average, during the first month, 4¥2 lbs. of grain 
per day and during the last 3 months not less than 13:Y2 
lbs. of grain per day or more than an average of 11 :Y2 lbs. 
of grain per day during the entire feeding period, taking 
the figures most favorable to the plaintiff. If he fed 15 
lbs. per day per head over the last 3 months of the feeding 
period, the average amount of grain per head per day was 
13 Ibs. In addition, however, to the grain, he fed 4 lbs. of 
dry beet pulp, molasses treated, the equivalent of grain. 
The cost of the grain and the dried beet pulp, molasses 
treated, would exceed 23:Y2c per animal per day for grain 
and dried beet pulp. The very minimum cost computed at 
llf2c per lb. for the grain fed. If the average over the feed-
ing period was 13 lbs. per day, the minimmn cost for grain 
and dried beet pulp was 25:Y2c. In addition, Rodney Martin 
fed 18 lbs. of hay at a cost of 7.2, which would bring the 
total cost of grain and hay to 32.7 c. In addition to the 
grain and hay, he fed 2 to 3 lbs. of corn silage with ripe 
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corn on the stalks and 5 lbs. of beet syrup, the values of 
which are not disclosed, but we submit that the cost of said 
feed by Rodney Martin was not less than 35c per head per 
day, for feeding animals weighing by at least 50 lbs. per 
head less than those fed by Gray (Tr. 602). 
Gilbert Johnson, one of plaintiff's witnesses, testified 
that he considered one pound to a pound and a quarter of 
grain per day per 100 lbs. of weight of the animal, to be 
good feeding (Tr~ 504). The testimony of Mr. Johnson 
corroborates fully the testimony of the defendant. The de-
fendant testified that he fed 15 lbs. of grain, at 1%, lb. per 
day per 100 lbs. of weight of aimals weighing 1300 lbs. Mr. 
Johnson would feed 15 lbs. of grain. Mr. Johnson also tes-
tified that he fed 2 lbs. of dry beet pulp per head per day 
and that he.fed 10 lbs. of pea silage per animal per day (Tr. 
506) and 20 lbs. of alfalfa hay per head per day (Tr. 504). 
Had Mr. Johnson been feeding the cattle fed by ·Gray, he 
would have fed, according to his testimony, 15 lbs. of grain, 
more than 2 lbs. of dried beet pulp, the equivalent of grain, 
more than 20 lbs. of hay, and more than 10 lbs. of pea sil-
age. The cattle fed by Johnson were heifers, steers and 
cows, and his steers weighed about 900 lbs. In the same 
proportion he would have fed Gray's steers 24 lbs. of hay 
at a value of 9.6c, and more than 2 lbs. of dried beet pulp 
at a value of more than 3c, or 35c per head per day, with-
out considering the 10 lbs. of pea silage. 
None of the witnesses called by plaintiff fed bran, or 
cotton-seed meal, which was fed by defendant. Defendant 
fed no beet pulp, corn silage or pea pulp. Probably his feeds 
were more expensive, but no one disputed that he fed the 
concentrated feeds that he testified to. 
·Counsel .intimates in his brief that the animals fed by 
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defendant would not consume the amount of feed that de-
fendant testified to. Such a statement is indeed strange 
when one of his own witnesses, Vaughn Davis, testified 
that he fed 20 lbs. of hay (Tr. 473), Sibs. of grain (Tr. 474), 
and 50 lbs. of beet pulp per animal per day (Tr. 474). The 
other Davis brother, Lavar Davis, testified that the 60 or 
64 head of animals were fed 3 tons of beet pulp each day. 
If so, each animal was fed more than 90 lhs. of beet pulp, 
in addition to the hay and grain (Tr. 589). 
We believe the evidence does not justify the Court's 
conclusion that a number of the witnesses testified to feed-
ing. 
In his brief, counsel suggests that the cost per day to 
Howard Stevens was 19c. Counsel neglected to observe 
that Howard Stevens fed some pea silage. The testimony 
of Howard Stevens, as observed in our original brief, pages 
22-3, illustrates only one thing, to-wit: How cattle should 
not be fed. If the Court's opinion is predicated on su~h 
feeding as was done by Howard Stevens, the Court has 
shut its eyes to the very purpose for which Gray was feed-
ing partnership cattle, the evidence would disclose that some 
of the cattle fed by Howard Stevens even lost weight (E. 
"F"). We are not surprised. We invite the Court to read 
again our observation on the feeding by Howard Stevens in 
our original brief, pages 32-3. (In proportion to the weight 
increases, Stevens' feed cost more than Gray's). 
As to the Davis contract, referred to by the Court, we 
submit that the testimony of Vaughn Davis, upon which 
plaintiff's counsel reaches his conclusion, is completely re-
pudiated by the other Davis brother, Lavar. Vaughn Da-
vis testified: "I was to be paid lOc a day, or lOc a pound 
for every pound I could gain on the steers" (Tr. 467). · He 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
testified he did not have to hire any help (Tr. 470), yet his 
brother, IJavar, testified that he, his brother Vaughn and 
another brother assisted in feeding the cattle (Tr. 488). 
Vaughn Davis testified that he didn't know the weight of 
the cattle when brought in or when taken out (Tr. 468). 
He testified he did not know the amount of hay fed, the 
amount of barley fed, or the amount of wheat fed, nor the 
amount of beet pulp (Tr .. 472). Only after he was called 
back for re-direct did his memory give him the information 
that he fed 20 lbs. of hay, 8 lbs. of grain and 50 lbs. of beet 
pulp (Tr. 474). He testified that Mr. Gray furnished no 
feed and that his brother got no grain from Gray (Tr. 472). 
Contradicting Vaughn Davis, Lavar Davis, one of the Davis 
brothers, testified that hay other than that raised on the 
ranch, was fed the cattle (Tr. 588). That he secured grain 
from Mr. Gray's ranch (Tr. 588). 
We submit that this Court is not justified in praising 
Stevens and condemning Gray upon such testimony as that 
given by plaintiff's witness, Vaughn Davis. 
We invite the Court to examine plaintiff's Exhibit "K" 
and the testimony of Dave Shuler, while on the stand. The 
contract discloses that the 198 head of partnership stee,rs 
turned over to Shuler weighed 191,252 lbs, or an average 
weight per animal of 966 lbs. 
Shuler was charged 6c per lb. for the total weight of 
the animals when taken in, and was to be allowed 7¥2c when 
taken out (Tr. 460). The contract provided that the steers 
should be fed for 75 days on hay, grain and probably beet 
pulp. Shuler testified that at the end of the 75 days he 
was requested to continue feeding them. That he declined 
to do so unless they paid an extra ¥zc spread (Tr. 460). 
That he fed the animals for another 29 days and received 
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8c per lb. at the end of that period. At the end of 104 days 
the animals were taken to defendant's feed lot and weighd. 
If the Davis brothers were to receive 10c a pound for 
every pound of gain in the steers, they would receive $10.00 
for feeding a steer 115 days if the increase in weight was 
100 lbs. The Shuler contract is before the Court. Had 
Shuler put no weight, whatsoever, on the cattle being fed 
by him, he would have received for each steer at the end 
of 104 days, $19.32. He was charged for them at 6c and 
was entitled to 8c per lb. at the end of the period. If he 
put 100 lbs. weight on the animal, he would have received 
in addition to the $19.32 an additional8c, or a total of $27.32 
for a steer that increased 100 lbs. in 104 days, whereas the 
Davis brothers would have received only $10.00 for the 
same increase in weight. What credence can the Court 
give to a witness such as Vaughn Davis, who testifies to 
such an absurd contract? 
In paragraph 7 or defendant's amended counterclaim 
(R. 41), it is alleged that Shuler fed 197 head of cattle and 
that he was paid $8359.08 therefor. This allegation is not 
denied or disputed. He also fed the cattle at 30c a day for 
29 days. He was paid $8.70 per animal or $1731.90 for feed-
ing the 197 steers the last 29 days. The balance of $8359.08 
received for feeding the steers the first 104 days, or a total 
of $6645.10. The 197 steers that were fed for 104 days 
represents 20,488 steer days, and the amount received per 
day per animal is the result of dividing the steer days into 
the total amount paid for the 104 days, ( $6645.10) , or 32.48c 
per day per animal. 
The Court's observation (or the suggestion) in the 
opinion that partnership cattle were fed for approximately 
211-hc per day under contract is certainly not born out by 
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the only written contract before the Court, to-wit: The 
Shuler contract. 
The testimony is undisputed that Shuler received 32.48c 
per animal per day for feeding partnersip cattle. 
It is significant that Shuler fed nothing but hay and 
corn. It is further signifi·cant that the animals being fed 
by Shuler weighed nearly 150 lbs less than the animals be-
ing fed by Gray. We submit that the trial court was jus-
tified in its decision after hearing the testimony of the wit-
nesses in finding the issues in favor of defendant. Certainly 
Gray was entitled to much more than Shuler for feeding 
animals weighing 150 lbs. more each, and for feeding much 
more e~pensive and concentrated diet. 
According to the testimony of Gilbert Johnson, one 
of plaintiff's witnesses, Shuler should have fed one and one 
quarter pound of grain per 100 weight for the additional 
150 lbs. Had he fed animals as large as the animals being 
fed by Gray, or at least 1 'Vs lbs. of grain per animal more 
than he fed the ones he had under contract, it would have 
cost him at least an additional 3c for grain alone. Shuler 
fed no cottonseed meal and no bran. 
We believe that a fair and impartial appraisal of the 
testimony of all the witnesses will show that plaintiff's wit-
nesses did not discredit in any way the testimony of Gray. 
They may have fed less, they may have spent less, but that 
does not prove that Gray did not feed more, nor does it 
prove that his feed would not cost more. The results of his 
feeding dearly justifies the amounts claimed when com-
pared with such feeding as was done by Howard Stevens. 
We therefore submit that the record and the testimony 
does not justify this Court in saying that the clear prepon-
derance of the evidence is against Mr. Gray. The trial 
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court's decision awarding Gray the amount which he testi-
fied he fed should be sustained by this Court. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANT WAS CHARGEABLE WITH THE LOSS OF 
31 HEAD OF PARTNERSHIP CATTLE NOT ACCOUN-
TED FOR AND IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
CHARGED THE PARTNERSHIP FlOR FEEDING SAID 
31 HEAD OF CATTLE. 
Plaintiff claims that defendant should be charged for 
31 head of cattle not accounted for by defendant. 
Counsel observes in his reply brief at page 20: 
"It is very significant that at no time prior to the sub-
mission of the case is there any evidence or pleading 
that even remotely intimates that the plaintiff ever dis-
posed of any partnership cattle that were not accoun-
ted for. It was not until the amended counterclaim 
was filed that respondent made any such suggestion, 
which as we have pointed out in our original brief, was 
not until September 5, 1947." 
We call the Court's attention to the fact that plaintiff 
made no claim against the defendant with respect to any 
missing partnership cattle until plaintiff filed his amended 
complaint on August 5, 1947. 
No intimation was made during the trial of such a con-
tention. 
In plaintiff's amendment to his original complaint, filed 
March 25, 1947 (R. 26-7), plaintiff alleged that certain cattle 
enumerated therein, belonging to plaintiff, were sold by 
defendant, but no accounting had been made nor had plain-
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tiff received the money from the sale of plaintiff's cattle. 
That the plaintiff did not know the amount received from 
the sale of said cattle, but he alleged that they were of the 
reasonable value of $4250.00. 
At the time this case was tried there was no pleading 
before the court even intimating that plaintiff sought to 
charge defendant with the loss of partnership cattle. He 
charged only that defendant had sold cattle belonging to 
plaintiff. 
There was no evidence intimating that defendant had 
misappropriated any cattle belonging to the partnership. 
Even in plaintiff's amended complaint, filed after the case 
was heard, there was no claim that defendant was charge-
able with 31 head of cattle not accounted for. 
Plaintiff alleged in paragraph 12 of his amended com-
pla~nt (R. 34) that defendant has sold a large number of 
cattle belonging to the partnership, and has appropriated 
to his own use the money received. 
Plaintiff failed to establish that defendant sold the 31 
head of cattle and failed to account for the proceeds and it 
was necessary for plaintiff to resort to a claim not presen-
ted in evidence, not pleaded, to-wit: 
That the cattle were missing. 
Plaintiff knows, as does this Court, and as the trial 
court knew, that the only way defendant could sell the cattle 
was after inspection and with a bill of sale (Sections 3-5-8 
to 17, R.S.U., 1933, Sections 4-13-17 to 4-13-67, U.C.A.1953) 
(Tr.252), or by slaughtering the animals, destroying the 
hides, and peddling the meat. The trial court declined to 
sustain plaintiff in his contention, and we believe that the 
evidence does not justify the conclusion that defendant con-
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verted the cattle to his own use or sold them and misap-
propriated the funds. 
Certainly plaintiff cannot allege that defendant sold 
the partnership cattle without showing a sale. If defend-
ant had sold the cattle without brand inspection, the de-
fendant, the buyer, and the shipper would have been guilty 
of a criminal offense. 
Plaintiff did not establish any particular cattle that 
were not accounted for. He knew the cattle bought. He 
admits in his brief in chief, at page 9, that defendant pur-
chased 880 head of cattle and then asserts the defendant 
doesn't know for whom some of the cattle were purchased, 
and yet plaintiff admits in his answer to defendant's amen-
ded counterclaim, (paragraph lOa), (R. 63), that the proper 
credit to be allowed defendant, for the purchase of partner-
ship cattle is $47,243.66, which is the exact amount defend-
ant claims he expended for the purcahse of partnership 
cattle, as shown in paragraph 5 of defendant's amended 
counterclaim ( R. 40) . 
Plaintiff states in his opening brief, pages 9 and 10, 
that plaintiff was not informed as to the purchase of 26 
head of cattle from Karl Alleman, and wasn't informed as 
to the purchase of 48 head from Orser and 29 head from 
Miller. 
Plaintiff testified that he could not say whether or not 
the 405 head of cattle sold by him (Plaintiff's Exhibit "G") 
included the Pitchforth cattle, the Lusty cattle, the Orser 
cattle, or the Alleman cattle (Tr. 550), and yet plaintiff tes-
tified that plaintiff's Exhibit "G" was a bill of sale for 405 
head of cattle, sold March 21, 1938, by plaintiff (Tr. 546). 
The Court's opinion states· that the partnership bought 
1405 head, but the accounts show only 1370 sold and only 
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4 lost, and then alleges that Gray claimed that he fed 31 
head more than he sold. 
The opinion further states that the Minersville cattle 
were shipped to Payson, where they were picked up by 
Gray's men. We submit that the evidence will support the 
Court' observation in only one respect, to-wit: 
That 1405 head were purchased by the partnership and 
the sales accounted for only 1370. The issue with respect 
to missing cattle arose from plaintiff's allegation with re-
spect to wintering Grantsville calves. 
In paragraph 5 of his original complaint (R. 5) plain-
tiff claims $215.00 for wintering 43 head of Grantsville 
calves. The credit is claimed as of date, 2-2-40. In para-
graph 6 of his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges (R. 32) 
that he wintered 43 Grantsville calves in 1937-8. 
Counsel claims at page 31 of his brief, under point 
2, that defendant conceded that plaintiff was entitled to 
credit for wintering the Grantsville calves. Let us look at 
the record. 
In paragraph 4 of defendant's answer to amended com-
plaint (R. 36) that item was denied and defendant alleged 
that plaintiff wintered cattle in 1936-7 and wintered no cat-
tle after 1936-7. 
Defendant has never denied that plaintiff was en-
titled to credit for wintering cattle in 1936-7, 
The record is undisputed, that the Grantsville calves 
we:re never wintered by plaintiff. 
Stevens testified that he had no partnersip cattle at his 
place in 1938 (Tr. 48). He did have cattle of his own. 
The Grantsville calves were purchased October 30, 1937 
(T:r. 180), as alleged in defendant's amended counterclaim 
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(R. 40), and admitted in plaintiff's reply thereto (Para-
graph 2 a) (R. 55). 
Stevens testified that Mr. Gray purchased the 215 head 
of Grantsville cattle. When asked if he knew where the 
cattle were put, he answered: "No, I don't remember now" 
(Tr. 24). Stevens' testimony that he didn't know where the 
215 head were put is not very convincing testimony that he 
ever wintered said 215 head. 
But, Stevens does claim that he wintered partnership 
cattle. We admit that he wintered them, but that they were 
wintered in 1936-7. The testimony is undisputed that the 
Grantsville cattle were wintered at Mosida (Tr. 189). Plain-
tiff further testified with respect to the partnership cattle, 
that he purchased cattle from Mr. Oakley on November 23, 
1936. That 3 head were put into the feed yard and the bal-
ance were turned into the herd we wintered otherwise (Tr. 
17). Mr. Stevens further testified that all of the cattle ex-
cept the Garrison and Baker cattle were taken away and 
put in the yards here in Utah County (Tr. 73). 
The defendant testified that in the winter of 1936-7 
he had in his feed yard only 18 head of partnership, 300 
head of his own and 36 head of Stevens' cattle (Tr. 141). 
No testimony offered attacks the testimony of Mr. Gray. 
We call the Court's attention to ~efendant's amended 
counterclaim, and particulary to paragraph 11 (R. 46 to 48). 
The first charge made by defendant to the partnership was 
for pasturing cattle is in May, 1937 (Item 2, R. 46). If Gray 
had all the partnership cattle in the winter of 1936 and 37, 
he certainly has cheated himself by making no charge for 
pasturing and feeding any of said cattle. 
Nor does the record justify the statement made in the 
Court's opinion that the Minersville cattle were picked up by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
Gray's men. The Court's observation is supported by the 
testimony as to the Minersville cattle purchased by plain-
tiff from Alfred Woods and Herb Eyer (Tr. 134), but there 
is no testimony that the Alma Marshall steers, 31 head, 
were ever picked up by Gray's men (Tr. 136). Even if the 
Court's statement were correct, it does not show that Gray 
wintered or had charge of the cattle in 1936-7. In fact, the 
evidence is uncontradicted that he did not have them in 
1936-7 (Tr. 141). If Gray did have the partnership cattle 
in 1936-7, Stevens should have asked the Court to correct 
the trial court's decision and allow Gray credit for feeding 
such cattle. That would be the magnanimous thing to do. 
Since Stevens admits that he wintered and sought cre-
dit for wintering 43 head of partnership cattle, and since it 
is certain that he did not winter the Grantsville calves; and 
since he wintered no cattle in 1937-8, he should be charged 
with the 43 head he wintered that are not accounted for, or 
at least with 31 head purchased from Alma Marshall at 
Minersville. 
We think the Court would be justified in making no 
charge to either partner for the so-called missing cattle. 
We believe the rule to be that the partnership must bear 
the loss unless it is shown that the same was occasioned by 
by fraud, culpable negligence, or bad faith on the part of 
one of the partners ( 68 C.J .S. 738) . 
We believe the pot is as black as the kettle, and that 
neither should ·be charged with the loss of any cattle. It 
is certain that more losses occurred than the four mentioned 
in the Court's opinion. One head was lost on the road to 
Delta (Tr. 140) , and defendant testified that they always 
lost one or two in Strawberry, and they lost 3 the first year 
(Tr. 337-8). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
There is uncertainty as to whether the Davis brothers 
fed 60 or 64 head of cattle. Counsel admits that uncertainty 
in his brief at page 43. 
Nor is there any evidence in the record to support the 
Court's opinion that Gray claimed credit for feeding 31 head 
more than he accounted for. Both the pleadings and the 
testimony justify but one conclusion: that Gray never 
claimed credit for feeding more than 1370 head. 
The only suggestion of such a fact is contained in plain-
tiff's original brief at pages 47-8. An examination of the 
record will disclose the number of cattle defendant charged 
the partnership for feeding, and the number of cattle that 
defendant sold. In his brief at page 47, counsel calls atten-
tion to item number 17 of defendant's amended counter-
claim, and states that he sought and was awarded credit for 
feeding 265 head of cattle from October 1st, 1938, to De-
cember 15, 1938. 
We submit that an examination of the record fully jus-
tifies defendant's claim and shows that defendant sought 
credit for feeding only the cattle that he accounted for. 
It is alleged in defendant's amended counterclaim that 
defendant fed 265 head of cattle from October 1st, 1938, 
to December 15, 1938 (R. 47, item 17 a). 
Defendant claims he fed 291 head from December 15, 
1938, to January 11, 1938 (R. 47, item 17 b). 
Defendant claims he fed 317 head of cattle from Janu-
ary 11, 1939, to February 2, 1939 (R. 47, item 17 c). 
All of the 317 head of cattle, which defendant charged 
the partnership with feeding were sold and fully accounted 
for and the number in the feed lot was reduced as the cattle 
were sold. 
It is alleged in the amended counterclaim (R. 40) that 
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defendant purchased 26 head of cattle from A. H. Miller on 
December 15, 1938, and that he purchased 26 head of cattle 
fro Karl Alleman on January 11, 1939. Defendant testified 
to the purchases (Tr. 205) and that testimony is not dis-
puted nor is the pleading denied. 
The 26 head purchased from Miller went into his feed 
lot December 15. The Miller cattle (26 head) brought the 
number of cattle on feed from 265 to 291 (R. 47, item 17 b). 
The Alleman cattle (26 head) brought the number of 
cattle on feed from 291 to 317 head (R. 47, item 17 c). 
The 317 head that Gray alleged he fed (265 head, 76 
days; 291 head, for 27 days, and 317 head for 22 days) were 
sold and fully accounted for (R. 41). 
On February 3, 1939, he sold 81 steers. On February 
23, 1939, he sold 26 steers. On March 2, 1939, he sold 206 
steers. On March 6, 1939, he sold 4 cattle to Jex. Those 
4 sales totaled 317 head, representing all the cattle that Gray 
had on feed from October 1, 1938, until the last .cattle were 
sold, on March 6, 1939. There is northing in the record to 
support any such arithmetic as eounsel attempts to confuse 
this Court with, in his brief at page 48. 
We submit that this Court should grant a rehearing 
and re-examine the record. It is our deliberate opinion that 
if the Court does this, it will reach the same conclusion that 
the trial court reached, and charge neither partner with the 
loss of any cattle. But if either is responsible for the loss 
of any cattle, that responsibility is plaintiff's. 
In the case of Thomas vs. Milfelt (Mo.) 222 S.W. sec-
ond 359, the Missouri court at page 362 said: 
"This being a suit in equity, it is the duty of this court 
to review the entire record and reach it's own conclu-
sions on the evidence. Nevertheless, there is a well rec-
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ognized and long established rule that in such a suit 
where there is conflict in the oral testimony of the par-
ties or witnesses the appellate court should accord due 
deference to the findings of the trial court. This rule 
is based upon the view that the trial judge is in the 
best possible position to weight such conflicting testi-
mony by virtue of the fact that he has an opportunity 
to observe the demeanor of the parties and witnesses 
while they are on the stand under oath giving their tes-
timony." 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO $1,000.00 FOR THE 
USE OF HIS PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE ON PARTNER-
SHIP BUSINESS. 
In its opinion, the Court observes that: 
"Stevens makes no strenuous objection to the allowance 
of some reasonable compensation for this purpose; in 
fact makes a sort of a left handed admission that the 
evidence would justify Gray's claim that he traveled 
about 15,000 miles in partnership activity." 
We invite the Court to read what we said in our brief 
at pages 53 and 54. We believe the evidence justifies a find-
ing that defendant used his personal automobile not less than 
20,000 miles. No convincing testimony to the contrary was 
offered. In fact, we submit that plaintiff confessed that de-
fendant was entitled to a judgment for $1050.00 
In counsel's brief, at page 22, counsel states: 
"The evidence will not support a finding that defend-
ant drove his automobile on partnership business to 
exceed 15,000 miles. It is admitted that testimony was 
offered that the reasonable cost of operating an auto-
mobile was 7 c a mile" (Tr. 454). 
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Counsel further observes in his brief at page 22, that 
if the court found the cost of operating an automobile was 
7 c per mUe, such finding would find support in the evidence. 
We think this Court's finding that defendant was entitled 
to only $750.00 is not only against the weight of the evi-
dence, but is against all the evidence. We think the pre-
ponderance of the evidence supports a finding that defend-
ant drove his car at least 20,000 miles on partnership busi-
ness. 
The testimony was offered that 7lj2 c is a reasonable 
charge per mile. Under no circumstances do we believe the 
evidence justifies any finding in favor of defendant for less 
than Sl,OOO.OO. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW DE-
FENDANT $1,000.00 CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN PAID 
ON PLAINTIFF'S NOTE AT THE COMlVIERCIAL BANK 
OF SPANISH FORK. 
Under point 5 of plaintiff's original brief, ·counsel states 
that a finding was justified that defendant had received 
from the sale of partnership cattle the sum of $77,145.49, 
and assumes that the court reduced that amount, $1,000.00 
to $76,145.49 because of the court's conclusion that defend-
ant paid $1,000.00 on the Stevens note at the Commercial 
Bank of Spanish Fork. 
As heretofore observed in our original brief, at page 45, 
that plaintiff is attempting to repudiate his own pleading. 
We invite the Court to examine plaintiff's answer to amen-
ded counterclaim (Paragraph 10 a) (R. 64). Plaintiff or-
iginally alleged that defendant was chargeable with cash 
admittedly received from the sale of cattle in the amount 
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of $77,145.49. An inspection of the record (64) discloses 
that the $77,145.49 was changed by penning a 6 over the 7. 
No question is raised as to the correctness of said figure. 
It will be observed that many changes have been made in 
plaintiff's answer to defendant's ·counterclaim. Such chan-
ges appear in the following pages of the record (R. 60, 61, 
62, 64, and 65). Certainly it cannot be presumed that the 
changes in plaintiff's verified answer made in pages indi-
cated, were made by anyone except plaintiff or by this Court 
at the suggestion of plaintiff. 
Said changes as we recall were made by the Court at 
the request of plaintiff. 
We believe that the opinion of this Court ·certainly does 
violence to the record and the testimony. Plaintiff stipu-
lated that Mr. Dixon, if called as a witness, would testify 
that Gray paid $1,000.00 on the note. In its opinion the 
Court suggests that the evidence of the banker would not 
be credible against Gray's admission that he did not pay 
the $1,000.00. 
It is hardly conceivable that if plaintiff and his counsel 
did not know that the payment had been made they would 
have entered into such a stipulation. 
As we observed in our original brief, page 3, defendant 
made the following statement: 
"A. Let me get this straight. I went into the bank 
and paid Mr. Dixon."----- (Tr. 423). Apparently the balance 
of defendant's answer, following the word Dixon, was not 
noted by the recorder. 
Whether defendant paid the $1,000.00 on the note to 
the bank, to Mr. Dixon, or to the plaintiff and the bank gave 
him credit, certainly the pl,aintiff after having stipulated 
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that he paid only $3300.00 and Gray paid $1,000.00 is tak-
ing a pos.ition which is unfair with respect to this item. 
It was the plaintiff who offered the proposed stipula-
tion; it was the plaintiff who said while his own witness, 
Mr. Dixon, was on the stand: 
MR. HANSEN: "The only thing I am now inter-
este in is whether you admit that his note of $4300 was 
paid, a thousand by Gray on the date he claims, and 
the rest was paid by Mr. Stevens. If you will admit 
that I don't care anything about the other ramifica-
tions of it." 
MR. WORTHEN: "You mean on the note which 
was given at the time this was taken up." 
MR. HANSEN: "He paid $3300 and Mr. Gray 
paid at housand dollars; that is all I am interested in" 
(Tr. 80) .. 
The court then observed: 
THE COURT: "You can agree that Mr. Stevens 
paid the note other than the thousand dollars, which 
Mr. Gray paid; that is a simple matter as I see it. Do 
you agree with Judge Hansen as to whether this par-
ticular note you have there of $4300 was paid by Mr. 
Stevens other than the sum of $1,000.00, which was 
paid by Mr. Gray." 
MR. WORTHEN: "I can only stipulate that Gray 
did pay $1,000.00 whether he paid any more than that 
I don't know." 
MR. PORTER: "We are willing to stipulate that 
this exhibit C was paid; and that the evidence of the 
pay would be that on March 18, 1941, Gray paid $1,000.-
00 and that the balance of the note was paid by Mr. 
Stevens. Now as I understand it that would be their 
testimony" (Tr. 81). 
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\Ve submit that the trial court who heard the testimony 
and the stipulation, certainly was justified in giving Gray 
credit for the $1,000.00. Stevens didn't claim that he had 
paid it. His counsel stipulated that the banker would tes-
tify that Stevens paid only $3300.00 on the $4300.00 note. 
There is no justifiable reason why this Court should have 
reversed the trial court for giving Gray credit for what Ste-
vens admitted Gray paid. 
The original note was produced for me in February, 
1953. I submitted the original note to plaintiff's attorney 
and it was agreed that I would have the note photostated 
and send one photostat to Judge Hansen and one to Jus-
tice Crockett, which was done. The photostat establishes 
that $1,000.00 was paid thereon by Mr. Gray. 
Certainly the decision of the trial court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE W. WORTHEN, 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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